Add supoprt for infix-firewall.yang, modeled on the zone-based firewalld
The terminology is a mix of firewalld, classic netfilter and inspired by
Ubiquity. E.g., zone 'policy' -> 'action', and the zone matrix overview.
- Port forwarding allows forwarding a range of ports
- Operational data comes from firewalld active rules
- Firewall logging goes to /var/log/firewall.log
- Show implicit/built-in rules and zones (HOST) in firewall matrix,
includes "locked" policy for the default-drop behavior
- The zone services field in admin-exec 'show firewall' shows ANY when
the zone default action is set to 'accept'
- Zone 'forwarding' and 'masquerade' settings live in Infix in the
policys instead, meaning users need to explicitly add a policy
to allow both intra-zone and inter-zone forwarding
- Support for emergency lockdown (kill switch)
- Pre-defined services (xml+enums) are filtered and included as a
separate YANG model, extensions added for netconf and restconf
- Includes initial support for firewalld rich rules
firewalld policy rules, including rich rules, have an obnoxious priority
field which is extremely hard to get right, so in Infix we use the far
superior YANG construct 'ordered-by user;'. This ensure all rules are
generated in that order by setting the priority field, on read-back from
firewalld (operational) the priority field is used to sort the output
of rules in the CLI.
Fixes#448
Signed-off-by: Joachim Wiberg <troglobit@gmail.com>
Non-privileged users in the sys-cli group can now access sysrepo data.
The data is now solely protected by the NCAM rules and not Unix file
permissions. Any stray user that's not part of the (default) sys-cli
group still can't access syrepo, like users added from the shell.
Fixes#932
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard@bit42.se>
The reason for this is:
1) We want to use the same fetch tool for all operational data, to
avoid having duplicated xpaths scattered across the repo.
2) We want to call this directly from the CLI, which means it need to
be escape safe. A unprivileged user shall be able to use it but not
escape into a shell or do other malicious stuff.
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard@bit42.se>